Friday, April 29, 2011

Teetering on the Knife's Edge

Unrest in Syria is spreading and escalating, as the civilian casualty count reaches at least 450 dead and protesters call for the fall of Assad. So far, killing hasn't sent the protesters home:

Syrian security forces opened fire on demonstrations in the capital of Damascus and the coastal city of Latakia — the heartland of the ruling elite — wounding at least five people. State-run television said a military post in Daraa was stormed by armed men who killed four soldiers and captured two.

Other demonstrations were reported in the central city of Homs, the coastal cities of Banias and Latakia, the northern cities of Raqqa and Hama, and the northeastern town of Qamishli. ...

A witness in Daraa, the city at the center of the revolt, said residents were staying home because the city has been under siege by the military since Monday, when thousands of soldiers stormed in backed by tanks and snipers. People were too afraid even to venture out to mosques for prayers, the witness said.

Strategypage has more on the crisis, including this detail that I hadn't caught when they reported it 4 days ago(although the article above mentions the clash, too):

In Daraaa, a town of 75,000 near the Jordanian border, some of the 5,000 troops from the 4th and 5th infantry divisions, sent to stop the growing rebellion there, opened fire on each other. This began when soldiers of the 5th division refused orders to fire on civilians. Soldiers from the 4th division, run by the president's brother Maher Assad, were seen firing on the troops who mutinied. Since then, soldiers have been fighting each other in Daraa and the military effort to take control of the town has been stalled.

Does this show that Syria finds itself in the position where its rulers won't reform, needs to kill more civilians to survive without real reform, but may not have the number of loyal troops needed to crank up the killing?

The Assad regime is losing. They don't want to lose. If they can't defeat the protesters at the current level of violence yet can't escalate violence without breaking their army (and if Iran can't send enough bully boys to make up for the lack of loyal Syrian troops willing to kill civilians), sparking a foreign crisis even if it risks a  war with Israel in Lebanon (from the link to my older post above) might be the only way out that the Baathists see:

Lebanon is the obvious choice for a battlefield in a war against Israel. If Syria marched a mechanized division into southern Lebanon "to show solidarity with" Hezbollah and the Lebanese people--and under the excuse that this is the source of all that foreign (Israeli) meddling that Assad claims is enflaming the unrest--he could generate a crisis that would compel Israel to decide whether to strike first to evict the Syrians. If Israel holds back, just the crisis might mute the budding revolt inside Syria. And if Israel strikes first at the Syrian expedition, it would be tough for protesters to stay in the streets without appearing to be allies of Israel. Assad could hope that Israel would be willing to keep the scope of the war limited to Lebanon and that the eventual loss of one of his divisions (assuming the UN doesn't demand a ceasefire to save the division) is well worth the price.

Of course, seeking a foreign enemy could backfire. Once the war ends, Assad would face a people angry at Assad for his repression and for losing a war. Assad wouldn't be the first dictator to miscalculate the rally around the flag ploy.

But Assad only has to think it would work for it to happen. Heck, all he has to have is the hope that it might work as opposed to the near certainty of defeat if he does nothing. He may believe he must do something to cope with the current crisis and worry about future crises later.

While Assad would only want a crisis and not a war, he may feel he has a safety net through Iran if Israel does attack his troops sent into Lebanon and Assad could send a less reliable division into Lebanon so that the Israelis would do the job for Assad of smashing up units Assad can't count on to defend his regime against protests). Hezbollah, with an assist by Hamas (with the newly reconciled West Bank Palestinian Authority in tow), could snatch victory from the jaws of defeat and save the Assad regime by ensnaring Israel in a rocket war against Israeli civilians closer to home to deter Israel from escalating the conflict beyond Lebanon.

No matter how low the odds of success really are, if this is how Assad sees as his only way out of this mess, he may take the shot. How else can he escape the problem of having a revolt to broad and committed for the number of loyal troops he has willing to shoot civilians?